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ABSTRACT 
 
 During the 1960s, intervention in Africa by both the UNO and former colonial 
powers such as France was imposed on Africans. After half a century, Pan-Africanists 
have started to challenge, sometimes successfully, sometimes unsuccessfully, the 
dominant powers in global governance. 
 
 Pan-Africanism has been the political driver for these counter-hegemonic 
attempts. Today African agency seeks to negotiate interventions in Africa to ensure 
they are at least partly by Africans and with Africans instead of external intervention 
in Africa. 
 
 There was complex dynamics between the AU, ECOWAS, NATO, the Arab 
League, and France during interventions in the civil wars in Côte D’Ivoire, Libya, and 
Mali. This paper argues that when the Pan-African agenda diverged from NATO 
preferences, South Africa and other African Union members faced major challenges 
in asserting African agency. When there was consensus between western and Pan- 
African actors, the African Union took the leading role. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
 The mainstream literature conventionally treats Africa as a problem to be 
solved, rather than analysing Pan-African agency as a peer participant in global 
governance. A forthcoming book (Edozie & Gottschalk, 2014) will be the first 
substantive scholarly work to present a counter-hegemonic perspective on this topic 
in international relations. 
 
 This paper examines three case studies highlighting pan-African contestation 
with global powers in three case studies: the Côte d’Ivoire in 2010; Libya in 2011, and 
Mali in 2012. 
 
PAN-AFRICANISM IN NEGOTIATING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
 
 The OAU started to set up an embryonic diplomatic corps with missions to 
represent it at the UNO (NY & Geneva), World Bank and IMF (Washington DC), EU 
(Brussels) and Arab League (Cairo). The increased stature of the AU saw a significant 
reciprocal development in 2006, when the USA became the first of over fifty-five 
states to accredit ambassadors to the AU, as did also several regional organizations. 
 
 Part of the functions of the AU diplomatic mission in NY was to seek to 
coordinate as much as possible a voting bloc by the AU states in the UN General 
Assembly. The AU and its Peace and Security Council (PSC) has also held regular 
consultations with the UN Security Council to influence UN peace-keeping and other 
interventions in Africa. The AU purpose is to assert African agency as a partner in 
global governance, and oppose the 1960s situation where Africa was merely the 
recipient of UN operations. 
 
 Both ECOWAS and the AU have established substantial peacekeeping 
architecture, with the AU adapting from the ECOWAS precedent. Operationally, both 
ECOWAS and the AU have escalated from conventional peacekeeping to 
“peacemaking” or “peace enforcement” which are diplomatic euphemisms for full-
scale war fighting up to brigades and divisions on battlefields ranging from Somalia 
to the Democratic Republic of Congo. In Adebajo’s words, the complexity in both 
Darfur, Sudan, and the DRC includes fighting in civil wars “with multiple factions 
that are often mutating”. (Adebajo:2011: 242) Nothing like this has been even 
attempted by the Arab League, OAS, and ASEAN, and would not even be 
contemplated by NAFTA or MERCOSUR. This is an interesting African case study 
where, for once, reality has raced ahead of rhetoric. The African Standby Force was 
supposed to be officially launched in 2010, with the formalities then postponed to 
2015. But AU and ECOWAS peacekeeping armies have continuously had boots on 
the ground for two decades. De facto, the African Standby Force has evolved towards 
Nkrumah’s African Standing Force, even before its formal inauguration. 
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TABLE 1: 
ECOWAS & AU PEACE-KEEPING ARCHITECTURE 
 
ECOWAS post-1993 AU post-2004 
Mediation & Security Council Peace & Security Council 
Ecowarn Continental Early Warning System 
Council of Elders Panel of the Wise 
ECOMOG, later ESF ASF 
Defence Council, &  
Defence Commission 
Military Staff Committee 
decisions by two-thirds majority decisions by two-thirds majority 
 
SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY ON THE CIVIL WARS  
IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE, LIBYA, AND MALI 
 
CÔTE D’IVOIRE 
 
 Lack of inclusivity has been a major factor precipitating many civil wars. The 
start of the twenty-first century saw the rise of the chauvinist Ivoirité  ideology 
leading to a law disqualifying as presidential candidates any Ivorian citizen not born 
in the country, plus Ivorian citizens born in the country who had either a father or 
mother that was a foreigner. This disqualifying of Alassane Ouattara, to ensure that 
Laurent Gbagbo won the presidential election,  led to the 2002 rebellion, resulting in 
the Côte d’Ivoire being partitioned between north and south, with each having its 
own army and administration. 
 
 South African President Thabo Mbeki, who had known Laurent Gbagbo when 
they were students, was appointed by the African Union as mediator between the two 
rivals for the period November 2004 – October 2006. Mbeki noted the conflict was 
over “Ivorian ethnic and religious antagonisms, sharing of political power, and access 
to economic and social power and opportunities.” (Mbeki: 2011) He noted the peace 
agreements called for the Côte d’Ivoire to be re-united, and the rebels disarmed, 
before new elections, to avoid the victory of one side causing a polarizing backlash 
from the other. 
 
 The 2010 elections were held before these conditions were met. The Ivorian 
Electoral Commission announced the provisional results as Ouattara winning with 
54.1% of the votes. The Constitutional Council, which by law adjudicates the final 
results, disqualified votes in some northern districts, resulting in Gbagbo being 
pronounced the winner. Mbeki, by that time a retired President, noted that an NGO, 
the Coordination of African Electoral Experts (CAEE), had reported in northern 
districts “stealing of ballot boxes, arresting of candidates representatives, multiple 
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voting, refusal to admit international observers to witness counting of ballots, and 
the murder of representatives of candidates.” (ibid).  
 
The UN Mission in the Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) and French forces reinforced 
Ouattara’s militia in arresting Gbagbo, who was sent to the International Criminal 
Court in the Hague. The ECOWAS Election observer mission did not issue a report 
on this disputed election. Mbeki forcefully argued that this case study confirmed the 
marginalization of the AU by the major powers acting both directly and through the 
UNO: 
 
“the events in Côte d’Ivoire could serve as a defining moment in terms of the urgent 
need to reengineer the system of international relations […..] How many blatant 
abuses of power will Africa and the rest of the developing world experience before the 
vision of a democratic system of global governance is realised?” (ibid) 
 
In this case, both the AU and ECOWAS, like the NATO powers, supported Ouattara’s 
accession to office. The South African Government’s stance became a minority 
position . 
 
LIBYA 
 
 Prior to the Arab Spring, Gaddafi had profoundly outraged a number of 
important African governments. He had advocated that Nigeria be dismembered into 
several countries; supported the Eritrean president against Ethiopia, occupied the 
Aouzou strip of Chad between 1972-87, and financed and armed JEM, the largest 
Darfur rebel organisation, against the Sudanese Government. (De Waal: 2013:366). 
These four chickens all came home to roost in 2011. 
 
 The AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) in its 23 February 2011 meeting 
condemned the repression of the pro-democracy uprisings in Benghazi and Misrata. 
They brought the issue before the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, with 
its seat in Arusha, which ordered the Libyan Government to cease attacks on 
civilians,in the Matter of the African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights v. 
the Great Socialist Libyan People’s Arab Jamahiriya Order 004/2011. 
 
South Africa led the three African members of the UNSC to vote for resolution 1973 
in March 2011, authorizing “all measures necessary” to protect civilians and civilian-
populated areas from attack, although Zuma had been advised by his ministry of 
Foreign Affairs that this phrasing could be ruthlessly exploited.  
 
By contrast, the Arab League called for intervention and supported to 
overthrown of Gaddafi, recognizing the National Transitional Council in Benghazi.  
(ibid., 368-369). French President Sarkozy held a 19 March summit to support the 
Libyan people. This was attended by Amr Mouki, Secretary-General of the Arab 
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League, but boycotted by Jean Ping, Chair of the AU Commission. NATO, the EU, the 
Arab League, Islamic Conference, and the UNO set up a Libyan Contact Group to 
liaise with the rebels. 
 
At its 10 March meeting, the PSC proposed a “roadmap” comprising a 
ceasefire, an inclusive peace agreement, and a democratic transition including free 
and fair elections. The PSC set up a High-Level mediation committee comprising the 
presidents of Congo, Mali, Mauretania, South Africa and Uganda. The US 
Government imposed a no fly zone and warned them that it could not guarantee their 
safety if they flew to Tripoli to negotiate with Gaddafi. The AU failed to set up public 
diplomacy and seek media coverage for their roadmap, leaving the NATO or P3 (the 
NATO permanent members of the UNSC) narrative dominant. This was in contrast 
to previous occasions where ’’in other conflicts the AU had worked well with P3 
diplomats on comparable proposals, jointly providing credibility and operational 
modalities.” (De Waal: 2013: 372)  The Sudanese Government from the start 
provided major military support to the Benghazi rebels, with Ethiopia and Nigeria 
recognizing the NTC as the provisional government immediately they liberated 
Tripoli from Gaddafi’s forces. 
 
 Africa was divided, with Mugabe supporting Gaddafi. After Zuma’s 
protests met western media derision that this was due to Gaddafi donations to the 
ANC. Mbeki put on record that SA opposition to NATO policy on was not due to that. 
Gaddafi gave zero support to the ANC during the anti-apartheid struggle decades, 
because one ANC and SACP leader Joe Slovo was Jewish, so Gaddafi considered the 
ANC to be Zionist. Only after 1990 did Gaddafi give aid to the ANC. Gaddafi (Sunday 
Times 6 November 2011) 
 
 An example of how foreign donors dictated to the AU: during 2011 the AU 
Commissioner for Peace & Security wanted to go to Libya for negotiations with 
everyone. Donors said their funds were not for discussions with Gaddafi. (City Press: 
2012) The South African Government ultimately too had to recognise the NTC as the 
legitimate government of Libya. 
 
MALI 
 
 Units of the Mali army staged a coup on 22 March 2012, weeks before a 
presidential election was due. After the coup ECOWAS immediately imposed 
financial and diplomatic sanctions on Mali. (www.voanews.com) This was followed 
by the MNLA rebels proclaiming in Timbuktu on 6 April 2012 a Republic of 
Azawaad, comprising a secession of over half of Mali. The MNLA was in weeks in 
turn overthrown by Ansar Dine and MUJAO with theological extremist policies. 
(WING: 2013) 
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 France sent 3 500 troops plus its air force to drive the rebels out of all towns 
and suppress the secession, after which they was replaced by 8000 troops of the 
African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA).   AFISMA broke 
new ground in that it comprised both ECOWAS armies plus those of Chad and Gabon 
from other regional communities. The US Assistant Secretary of Defence for Special 
Operations was of the opinion that AFISMA was “completely incapable” of replacing 
French forces. (www.France24.com)  
 
ECOWAS set up a working group to implement UNSC resolution 2085 on 
Mali for a UN force. (ECOWAS 002/2013) The ECOWAS Mediation and Security 
Council (MSC) appointed as mediators two sitting presidents, Blaise Compaore and 
Goodluck Jonathan. It welcomed UN funding to convert AFISMA into MINUSMA. 
(ECOWAS 208/2013) Mali set up a Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission. 
A critical Mbeki observed that “Africa is failing to set its own terms for tackling 
security challenges on the continent.” (www.bdlive.co.za)    
 
 The AU’s lack of budgetary and logistical capacity to send its own force in 
resulted in its support for the French, then ECOWAS, then UN intervention forces. 
The South African Government was mute on the Malian civil war, probably being too 
overstretched militarily and financially to propose more AU-led options. 
Nonetheless, Edozie argues: 
 
the promise of Africa’s African Union rests in the institution’s sustained agency and 
voice, its Pan-Africanist resilience, consciousness of, and commitment to African 
solidarity, and its institutional dirigsme that allows the institution to innovate while 
evolving and lead Africans in global partnerships.  
All these elements were evidenced in the AU’s Mali Donor Conference, held in Addis 
Ababa on January 28th, 2013. In an historic first action (where the AU would spend 
a majority of its budget on a peacekeeping operation), the Union pledged a total of 
$50 million to help fund the military intervention in Mali,  as well as drum up 
support for the African-led mission in Mali, or AFISMA. The AU-led donors’ 
conference on Mali galvanized and solicited African and international matching fund 
for the operation that it budgeted at an estimated cost of $460 million. Algerian, 
Ramtane Lamamra, the AU's Peace and Security Commissioner told reporters: "For 
the first time in the history of the African Union, the budget will be used to support a 
peace operation. It represents around ten percent of the overall budget of AFISMA. 
This is unprecedented.” (Edozie & Gottschalk: forthcoming 2014) 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 First, NATO powers were adroit at exploiting divisions between AU and Arab 
League policy positions, and between individual African governments such as Sudan 
and South Africa. For the AU to take policy means consensus or compromise 
between at least a majority of 54 governments, which is a far higher number than 
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members of any other regional organization, such as the EU, OAS, ASEAN, or Arab 
League. It is a correspondingly remarkable achievement that the AU has nonetheless 
been able to take policy on so many conflicts. 
 
 Second, where there was consensus between ECOWAS and the French 
Government, as over the Côte D’ivoire and Mali, military intervention occurred 
successfully. Where much of the AU disagreed with NATO stances, as in the Libyan 
civil war, donor dependency, and lack of budgetary and financial capacity, meant that 
NATO powers got their way. 
 
 Third, the AU preference for a negotiated end to the Libyan civil war was 
confirmed as the protracted consequences of the muscular NATO actions persisted 
throughout 2012 and 2013. The Tripoli Government appears to have a Weberian 
monopoly of violence over less than half the country, and still lacks the capacity to 
overwhelm large numbers of local militia who run their own jails, and torture 
detainees just as Gaddafi’s regime did before them. 
 
 Fourth, the consequences of the Libyan civil war included what US securocrat 
jargon terms blowback: it spilled over in 2012 into Mali, as defeated Gaddafi 
mercenaries retreated with their arms, precipitated a coup, then led to a rebellion of 
secession, which in turn was overwhelmed by a second wave of hard-line rebels. 
 
 Fifth, the South African Government’s effectiveness within the AU heavily 
depends on it persuading allies, and harmonizing and coordinating its foreign 
policies with those of Nigeria, Ethiopia, and other major continental players. 
 
Sixth, the AU and ECOWAS both persisted in trying to negotiate the terms of 
engagement with the dominant powers in global governance. Sometimes they lost, 
sometimes they won. But they demonstrated markedly more pan-African agency 
than was present in the 1960s.  
 
The challenge for the AU and ECOWAS will be to increase their budgets so as 
to reduce their donor dependency over the next decade or two. The AU’s Peace and 
Security Council has met more than 333 times since its inauguration in 2004: 
twentyfold the average number of meetings of any other AU organ. This shows a 
continuing commitment to build up the African peace and security architecture 
towards the AU’s longue durée vision for 2063. 
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